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Abstract. Though piracy accounts for only a small fraction of the general losses of 
the maritime industry it creates a serious threat to the maritime security because of 
the connections between organized piracy and wider criminal networks and 
corruption on land. Fighting piracy requires monitoring the waterways, harbors, 
and criminal networks on the land to increase the ability of the decision makers to 
predict piracy attracts and manage operations to prevent or contain them. Piracy 
surveillance involves representing and processing huge amount heterogeneous 
information often uncertain, unreliable, and irrelevant within a specific context to 
detect and recognize suspicious activities to alert decision makers on vessel 
behaviors of interest with minimal false alarm. The paper discusses the role of 
information fusion, and context representation and utilization in building an   
piracy surveillance picture.  
Keywords. Piracy threats maritime surveillance, context, reasoning, ontologies 
Introduction 
According to the International Maritime Bureau's (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center 
piracy has been on the rise for years. There are multiple reasons for this such as [2]: 
• limitless range of vulnerable targets, enormous volume of commercial ships;  
• the need for ships to pass through congested (and ambush-prone) choke points;  
• vast territorial waters;   
• skeleton crews; 
• limited resources for monitoring territorial waters and ports;  
• lack of international laws;  
• corruption and easily compromised judicial  structures;  
• situation in Somalia;  
• willingness of ship owners to pay ransom;  
• limited inter-government cooperation, etc.  
Although piracy accounts for only a small fraction of the general losses of the 
maritime industry it creates a serious threat to the maritime security due to the 
connections between organized piracy and wider criminal networks, and corruption on 
land. Specifically piracy represents direct threat to the lives and welfare and direct 
economic impact (fraud, stolen cargos and delayed trips and could undermine a 
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maritime state’s trading ability); undermining and weakening governing legitimacy by 
encouraging corruption; and can lead to major environmental disaster. 
Piracy as an economically driven phenomenon has specific goals and 
characteristics, which may be different, form ones of maritime terrorism. At the same 
time there are multiple similarities between them [7].  They use the same opportunities 
due to similar vulnerable targets caused, e.g., by the enormous volume of commercial 
ships, congested choke points.; or may use similar tactics. For example terrorists could 
hijack ships carrying huge loads of highly flammable materials to undertake a suicide 
mission or to ram a hijacked vessel against the container terminal or an oil refinery. 
Piracy and terrorist attacks are carefully planned and orchestrated, both types require 
significant resources and well organized crime/terrorist rings. Both terrorists and 
pirates use small boats, which are not much different from fishing boats. Thus the 
surveillance means and methods developed for asymmetric warfare and vastly 
published in the literature may be used for building a maritime surveillance picture. At 
the same time the means and methods for maritime surveillance have to be considered 
in the piracy context to be in order to be usable. 
The process of constructing a dynamic surveillance picture for piracy threat 
detection and recognition involves contextual reasoning about the observed objects, 
processes, and events, as well as relations between them with respect to particular goals, 
capabilities, and policies of the decision makers. In this paper we elaborate on the role 
of information fusion, and context representation and exploitation in building such 
surveillance picture. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an 
introduction to the piracy problem and the role of information fusion processes in 
building a surveillance picture. Section 2 focuses on context definition and 
representation. Section 3 depicts a context based reasoning process for threat detection 
and recognition, and discusses possible approaches to its implementation. Finally, 
Section 4 presents conclusions.  
1. Piracy threat surveillance and information fusion 
“In a world where small water craft can be turned into weapons against navy destroyers 
and pirates can hold ships for ransom, surveillance of the sea is of increasing 
importance. Because of the very large area to keep under surveillance resources are 
inadequate to monitor the world’s shipping channels, tools that help maritime 
surveillance analysts identify suspicious activity are extremely valuable.”[9]  
Detection and recognition of suspicious activity requires utilization of all available 
information (sensors, intelligence, and operational information) for monitoring the 
most vulnerable entities and facilities (such as commercial ships, harbors, linked 
coastal areas, etc). Exploitation of this information for building a reliable surveillance 
picture to support an analyst is complicated by many factors including: 
• Large and heterogeneous area 
• A large number of heterogeneous vessels, ranging from small recreational 
sailboats, tug boats and jet skis, to big commercial and cargo vessels. 
• Multiple distributed decision makers from diverse agencies and different countries, 
with different goals, functions, and information requirements. 
• Abundant available knowledge on regulations and predefined behavior of the 
vessels. 
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• Presence of distributed, uncertain, low fidelity, unreliable, irrelevant, and 
redundant transient information. 
The key technology for building a surveillance picture is information fusion, a set of 
interrelated processes dealing with data and information at different levels of 
abstraction to produce:  
• information about a single entity of interest by continuous detection, identification, 
tracking and tracing of vessels with observation systems  (lower level fusion); 
• knowledge about situation and threat (higher level fusion). 
Given the aforementioned challenges, the surveillance processes must include all 
fusion levels. Lower level fusion must combine sources of data and information  to 
provide unified and  reliable tracking and recognition of all interesting entities. Usual 
technologies include vessel traffic service, coastal radars, electro-optical/infrared 
sensors, AIS system, etc, whose complementary nature allows enhancing the 
performance of each technology. For instance, GPS/DGPS accuracy and velocity data 
can to improve radar tracker estimates. To do that, it is necessary to conduct alignment, 
correlation and combination of all available information in a common spatio-time 
reference system.  
The goal of higher level fusion is to transform information about vessel identity 
and tracks into knowledge about potentially suspicious behavior to aid the operator in 
recognition of this behavior as threat or false alarm. This knowledge is based on 
inferred relationships between physical entities considered in a specific context, which 
is continually being refined as data and information arrives. Contextual information 
such as traffic configuration, restricted area, maritime rules, coordinated operations, 
etc., is an essential information to improve these aspects of surveillance.
Previous works have suggested to use the contextual knowledge (configuration and 
features maps) to minimize the impact of clutter areas, missed detections, loss of 
resolution in high density areas such as docking areas, etc.). In [1, 3], some examples 
are given to tune the tracking algorithms and its parameters to adapt to the regions (sea, 
coast, earth). Other studies [5,14] propose to refine  the model for vessel track 
prediction by taking into account channel configuration, allowed or preferred routes, 
presence of geo-coded coastal points and navigation aids, limitations derived from 
channels depth, excluded areas, etc. However, the methods used to improve the result 
of lower level fusion with contextual knowledge have to go beyond the only utilization 
of a priori information.  Better interpretation of sensor data for more reliable tracking 
and vessel recognition should also use dynamic representation of situation allowing for 
context refinement and discovery. Thus dynamic interaction between lower and higher 
level fusion should be used to improve the fusion process at all levels. The next section 
will discuss the problem of context representation and exploitation in more detail. 
2. Context representation 
Context is defined by the Webster dictionary as  “the events or circumstances that 
form, or influence, the environment, within which something exists or takes place.” 
This definition points out to two different context paradigms introduced in [6] and 
further discussed in [13]. These paradigms correspond to two different but 
complementary views on context: in the “Context of X” (CO) and “Context for X” (CF). 
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The reference item X represents “any physical or conceptual entity and event” such as, 
e.g., a speed boat.”  
CO is a part of the environment, which represents a set of items and relationships 
“grouped or contained by X.” We have certain expectations about X based on CO, e.g. 
in the context of situation in Somalia we can expect easy recruitment of potential 
pirates.  Expectations defined by CO can be used for detection of possible threat based 
on expectations about observations obtained by surveillance evolving crisis (e.g. 
normal boat speed). Deviations from expected situational items and relations between 
them may alert decision makers and can initiate causal reasoning for discovery of a 
possible cause explaining such deviations. Knowledge about CO also offers predictions 
of the dynamics of current observations or pirate actions (e.g., in the context of 
willingness to pay ransom). Constrains goals, objective, functions, actions of the threat 
responders (what can be done given relations between countries in Malacca Strait). 
Alternatively, CF defines the contextual space of items externally related to and 
referenced by X:  the weather provides a context for the level of reliability of 
observations. Situation assessment processes use CF to better understand reference 
items and relations between them.  Decision makers have to take CF into consideration 
to optimize actions. For example, the time of the day may change deterrence actions.  
A set of items and relations of interest (the reference items X) constitutes the 
problem variables. A set of items and relations defining a CF can be called context 
variables. Context variables represent auxiliary variables. They affect knowledge about 
problem variables, reasoning about them and, therefore, decisions and actions based on 
the characteristics and behaviors of problem variables. Context variables may be both 
static (e.g., a port map) and dynamic (e.g., weather). 
Context should be considered at different levels of granularity due to the 
distributed nature of the problem. Following [12, 13] we shall survey the context 
models most applicable to information fusion: (a) Key-Value Models, (b) Ontology-
based models, and (c) Logic-based models. Key-Value Models are the simplest way of 
representing context. They provide values of context attributes as environmental 
information and utilize exact matching algorithms on these attributes. These models 
may suffice for use in Level 1 fusion, but they lack capabilities for complex structuring 
required by higher level fusion. Ontology-based models provide a formal and uniform 
way for specifying core concepts, sub-concepts, facts and their inter-relationships to 
enable realistic representation of contextual knowledge for reasoning, information 
sharing and reuse. At the same time ontologies do not support uncertain, unreliable, 
and imprecise context representation inherent to the piracy surveillance problem [4]. 
Logic-based models represent context as facts and information inferred from rules.  The 
dynamic uncertain harbor surveillance scenario calls for a hybrid context representation 
combining ontology and logic based models enriched by uncertainty consideration. 
In the case of maritime domain (including piracy), the context representation 
should integrate all dynamic information obtained as a result of: (i) vessel traffic 
information systems, such as pre-planned arrivals, ship mooring arrangements, and data 
from approach-speed and mooring strain sensors; (ii) IMO (International Maritime 
Organization) security protocols, including that coming from AIS (Automatic 
Identification Systems), ISPS (International Ship and Port Facility Security) codes, 
ship-to-shore alarms, and security and inspections. The knowledge to be considered 
may comprise the description of maritime (and harbor) areas and navigation restrictions 
expressed in general terms as a certain set of rules, comprising additional external 
knowledge such as applicable regulations and vessel traffic service manuals. For 
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instance, we can consider the following general traffic rules [4] as part of context 
representation: 
• Identification: ships entering/leaving the harbor must have a permission of 
Harbor Authority: destination, arrival/departure times, passengers/cargo  
• Speed limit: The speed limit usually is defined for areas, lower in inner parts and 
higher outer. Typical values may be 5-10 knots within the harbor areas 
• Navigation: there are predefined limited areas for different categories of vessels. 
Crossing generally forbidden 
The knowledge of all applicable rules can be essential to understand the situation 
and evaluate the normalcy of operations. In addition some regulated procedures, can be 
used to decide if the set of entities are exhibiting expected behavior. For instance 
specific harbor norms for special types of ships like oil containers require to follow 
towage/guidance boats along the harbor channels, this knowledge may explain complex 
ineteraction among tracked entities. Finally, it is essential to take into account that 
information required to understand how the vessels follow these rules can be 
incomplete, erroneous, uncertain, ambiguous or approximate. 
3. Reasoning about pirate threat 
Ontologically threat can be defined as a tri-part integrated whole (viable threat) and a 
two part integrated whole (potential threat). The parts or members of threats are often 
extended over spatial regions or temporal periods, dispersed wholes, which nonetheless 
contain parts or members that stand to one another via a certain unifying feature or 
characteristic of that whole and require more complex reasoning about their spatial-
temporal relationships than unitary wholes [8]. Building piracy surveillance requires 
monitoring and detecting the parts of threat, their characteristics, behavior, and spatio-
temporal relations between them in a specific maritime piracy context to identify 
potential threat (unitary or dispersed) and its dynamics to identify imminent threat. 
For example potential threat monitoring may require tracking small arm trafficking 
(capability monitoring), unusual coordinating activity in the land contacts (intent 
monitoring) and their temporal relation (within the same time interval). Surveillance of   
high vulnerability areas (e.g. chocking point) can me an example of imminent threat if, 
for example, decision makers were alerted on existence of a potential threat.  
The process of reasoning for detection and recognition of piracy threat and the role of 
context in this process is shown on figure 1.  In this process, reasoning in the uncertain 
piracy surveillance environment requires: 
• Detection of possible inconsistency between expected corresponding to “no threat” 
situation, and observed objects, relations, situational items, and their behavior  
• Understanding the source of inconsistency, i.e., whether this inconsistency is the 
result of insufficient quality of contextual knowledge, observations, fusion 
processes or potential or immanent threat is discovered 
Inconsistency detection may be based on explicit “normalcy” or anomaly models by 
using: values of characteristics or behavior of situational items obtained from the 
domain knowledge, rules (e.g. presence or absence of certain characteristics), 
hypothesis testing. Both types of these methods have some drawbacks.   
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Figure 1. The reasoning process  for detection and recognition of piracy threats and 
the role of context  
 
 
Thus building a normalcy model may have a scalability problem (to many normal 
situations) while abnormal behavior can encounter the “black swan problem”. Another 
methods relay on incremental learning operating on evolving data (“on-line” stream 
classification problem”). These methods can identify unseen earlier patterns of 
behavior or characteristics but may encounter the situation, in which a pattern 
considered as anomaly could become normal when more information is available. 
Reasoning for explaining the source of inconsistency (abduction) can be of two 
types: qualitative, in which uncertainty is handled by manipulation of symbols and 
quantitative, in which uncertainty is encoded by numbers.  At the same time no such 
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method is able to deal with all types of uncertainty and utilization of hybrid approaches 
are required. 
One of the hybrid paradigms that can be considered for abductive uncertain 
reasoning proved itself in threat detection is the Belief-based Argumentation System 
(BAS) [10], BAS is an approach to non-monotonic reasoning under uncertainty, 
combining symbolic logic with belief theory for judging hypotheses about the unknown 
or future world by utilizing given knowledge.  Logic is used to find arguments in favor 
of and against a hypothesis about possible causes or consequences of the current state. 
An argument is built on uncertain assumptions that make the hypothesis true, or false.  
Every assumption is linked to a non-additive belief that the assumption is true or false. 
The beliefs that the arguments are valid are used to compute the credibility of the 
hypothesis, which can then be measured by the total belief that it is supported by the 
totality of supportive and refuting arguments.  The resulting degree of support 
corresponds to belief of the theory of evidence and is used to make a decision whether 
a hypothesis should be accepted, rejected, or whether the available knowledge is 
insufficient to form a satisfactory judgment at this time. The beliefs assigned to the 
assumptions can be expressed in linguistic form; e.g., very high, high, low, very low 
with subsequent quantization of these linguistic values. The beliefs can be also 
represented numerically and be approximated by a function of the values assigned to 
attributes and relationships characterizing the state of environment and related to the 
assumptions. In some cases these belief measures can be the result of a combination of 
beliefs based on different characteristics with the Dempster rule [11]. Arguments and 
assumption can be provided by ontological reasoning through definition of contextual, 
heuristic, and common sense conditions that activate an interesting situation in the 
piracy surveillance scenario.  
The following example illustrates the application of the BAS to recognition of 
possible threat from a boat [4]: 
• Boat features (speed, direction, type, flag, etc.)  
• Spatio-temporal relations between the suspicious boat and others, or relations 
between the boat and harbor zones  
• Beliefs assigned to assumptions are based on the observed spatio-temporal 
relations  and correspondence of the boat behavior to rules and regulations 
One of the arguments pro hypothesis “treat” from a vessel can be built as a conjunction 
of the following uncertain assumptions: 
A1: the suspicious boat is too close to a vessel sailing in the opposite direction. 
A2: The vessel following in the opposite direction is a big cruise ship.  
A3: The suspicious boat is increasing its speed. 
Each assumption is assigned a belief measure, representing belief that this 
assumption is true. In our example these belief measures are modeled as functions of 
the behavior of suspicious vessel characteristics (increased speed), type of the vessel 
following in the opposite direction, and relation “close” between the suspicious vessel, 
a vessel following in a different direction. Thus, the belief in “too close” can be 
measured as a function of (1) the difference between the distance observed and the 
distance allowed for consideration big cruise ship, and (2) the accuracy and reliability 
of the distance observed. 
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5 Conclusions 
The maritime piracy threat detection and characterization requires exploitation of 
advanced information fusion processes, which must be adaptive and context-sensitive. 
This paper has discussed some aspects of designing such processes, including  contexts 
representation and exploitation and possible approach to  reasoning under uncertainty 
adapted to maritime piracy surveillance domain.  
There are many open questions related to designing an operational surveillance 
system for assisting an operator in piracy threat recognition and deterrence. Some of 
them are associated with hybrid context representation combining ontology and logic 
based models incorporating uncertainty with an appropriate trade-off between 
completeness and complexity, formal aspects to model anomaly and context dynamics. 
Another challenge is an effective integration of such contextual representation at all 
fusion levels.  
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